Why Do Spouses Hide Income by Malapit, Hazel Jean L
Why Do Spouses Hide Income?
Hazel Jean L. Malapit
March 2012
Abstract
This paper proposes a simplied model of intrahousehold decision making where co-
operative and noncooperative behavior are not mutually exclusive. Individuals choose
the optimal share of income they wish to devote towards cooperation, where income
is pooled and allocated collectively, and towards noncooperation, where income is al-
located independently. Using the example of joint saving as an area of household
cooperation, this model shows how limited autonomy and bargaining power can inter-
act to create incentives for individuals to hide income. This result provides theoretical
support for the call to collect survey data separately from individuals rather than from
household representatives.
I. Introduction
It seems obvious that anybody could keep a secret stashof money behind their spouses
back if they wanted to. Even the earliest typologies of money management arrangements in
male breadwinner households implicitly allowed for some hiding of income (see Pahl, 1983,
1989, 1995, for an in-depth discussion). Nevertheless, this aspect of intrahousehold decision
making has been overlooked by social scientists because, rst, the hiding of income was
expected to be small and therefore immaterial, and second, it does not immediately appear
to have other important consequences. There is growing evidence, however, that not only is
the amount of hidden income substantial in both developed and developing countries, but
also that it has broader implications on the way economists conduct household surveys and on
the rigor of the empirical analyses that use them. Taking this issue seriously raises a number
of questions: Under what conditions do these decisions take place and what incentives do
spouses face? What role does bargaining power play? Is there reason to believe that women
are more likely than men to hide income, as popular media suggests (Whitaker, 2004)? Are
there fundamental di¤erences between, for example, the decision of a Kenyan woman to join
a secret saving club(Anderson and Baland, 2002), the decision of a Japanese woman to
keep her hesokuri or belly-button money (Whitaker, 2004), and the decision of an American
woman to open a private bank account (Whitaker, 2004; Allianz, 2006)?
To explore why spouses hide income, this paper proposes a simplied model of intra-
household decision making where cooperative and noncooperative behavior are not mutually
exclusive. This model di¤ers from other noncooperative bargaining models in that each per-
sons decision to cooperate is characterized as a continuous decision variable. This approach
allows individuals to choose the optimal share of income they wish to devote towards cooper-
ation, where income is pooled and allocated collectively, and towards noncooperation, where
income is allocated independently. Since individuals can choose to contribute less than their
full income, the realized gains from cooperation can also vary according to the contributions
of each partner. Using the example of joint saving as an area of household cooperation, this
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model shows how limited autonomy and bargaining power can interact to create incentives
for individuals to hide income.
In contrast, intrahousehold allocation models describe the behavior of married couples
as either cooperative or noncooperative. Cooperation implies that couples pool all their
resources and then jointly decide how these resources are allocated, be it through consensus,
Nash bargaining (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981), or some other
form of collective decision making (Chiappori, 1988, 1992, 1997). If cooperation breaks
down and divorce is not feasible,1 individuals retreat to their fallback positions given by
the noncooperative solution within marriage (for example, see Lundberg and Pollak, 1993;
Carter and Katz, 1997; Chen and Wooley, 2001). Noncooperation implies that individuals
allocate their own resources according to their personal preferences. Any contributions to
household public goods in the absence of cooperation are therefore voluntary, and may be
guided by socially-accepted gender roles (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993).
This depiction of household decision making has important implications for the collec-
tion of nancial information in household surveys. Cooperation implies that information is
publicly shared within households, while the withholding of information implies noncoop-
eration.2 The conventional belief that families are inherently cooperative, or at the very
least share information completely even when they do not cooperate, is the rationale for the
collection of nancial information at the household level.3
There is growing evidence, however, that the extent of privately-held information missed
by conventional household surveys may be substantial. A number of specialized surveys that
collect income and other nancial information from spouses in separate interviews show
that some nancial transactions undertaken by individuals were unknown to their partners.
For example, data collected by Markus Goldstein and Christopher Udry in Ghana reveal
signicant di¤erences in what couples know about each others income and expenditures
(Goldstein, 1999). Similarly, Ashraf (2009) nds that 34 percent of husbands in her sample
make more money without their wifes knowledge, while 29 percent of wives make more
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money without their husbandsknowledge. In addition, her randomized eld experiment
provides evidence that Filipino men prefer to hide extra income when they know that their
wives will not nd out (Ashraf, 2009). These ndings are not unique to developing countries,
however. A 2006 Allianz survey of 3,183 adults in the United States reveal that 18 percent of
women and 9 percent of men keep a secret stashof cash unknown to their spouse (Allianz,
2006).
The prevalence of privately-held nancial information may suggest that the behavior of
married couples is better described by individual-level or noncooperative models. In many
cases, however, the hiding of nancial information is accompanied by seemingly coopera-
tive behavior. Ashraf (2009) observes that some individuals choose to conceal a portion of
their income even while reporting joint control over nancial decisions. A similar pattern
emerges among Thai and Filipino couples in the 2002 Urban Poor Home Worker Survey
(UPHWS), where some individuals report both joint and personal saving accounts.4 These
studies suggest that cooperative and noncooperative behavior are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. Partial or semi-cooperation can be done overtly, where the withheld portion of
individual incomes are publicly known within the household, or covertly, where individuals
report or disclose only the portion of income or assets that they wish to contribute to the
household pool and then conceal the rest.5 Such semi-cooperative behavior can be justied
using existing household models by assuming that some household decisions are cooperative,
while some are noncooperative (Agarwal, 1997; Katz, 1997). Nevertheless, existing models
are unclear on how both cooperative and noncooperative behavior can arise simultaneously
within the same types of decisions, e.g., saving, as the evidence suggests.
The possibility that households behave semi-cooperatively reinforces the issues raised by
noncooperative household models on traditional survey methodology. Estimation of demand
functions that use household income as a regressor can yield biased estimates if surveys
measure household income incorrectly by relying on a single household informant. This
measurement error is easily corrected if such errors arise randomly. But if the degree to
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which individuals keep nancial information private varies systematically, say with bargain-
ing power or other characteristics, then this measurement error may be endogenous. This
endogeneity introduces an additional source of bias for empirical analyses that use household
income as a regressor (Ashraf, 2009). The model proposed in this paper demonstrates how
cooperating couples can, at the same time, behave noncooperatively, thus providing further
theoretical support for the call to collect nancial information individually and separately
for couples.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief survey of related
literature on intrahousehold allocation, followed by a description of the general model setup,
its application to savings, and a discussion of the implications of limited autonomy in Section
3. Section 4 concludes.
II. Brief Review of Related Models
Economists have traditionally described household behavior as unitary. As its name
suggests, the unitary model treats the household as if it were a single utility-maximizing
agent. In the unitary model, a benevolent dictator or representative agent allocates pooled
household income to maximize household welfare. A household may act as one if all of its
members has identical or common preferences (Samuelson, 1956), if one member acts like a
dictator out of benevolence (Becker, 1981), or if one member acts like a dictator out of their
ability to use violence on other members (Alderman et al., 1995).
An important shortcoming of the unitary model is that it is not clear how conicting
preferences within households are resolved. Instead, unitary models portray the household
as a harmonious whole, which, ideal as it may be, runs counter to common experience.
Becker (1981) addressed this concern through his famous Rotten Kid Theorem, which
demonstrated how dissenting wives defer to their altruistic husbands out of self-interest. This
defense of the unitary model was not entirely convincing to many researchers who sought
alternative models of household decision making. This led to a new class of collective or joint
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decision making models that recognize the distinct preferences of individual members but
di¤er primarily in the mechanisms by which families are assumed to resolve their di¤erences.
Two types of collective models have since dominated the literature: Nash coopera-
tive bargaining models, and the sharing-rule approach or Chiappori-type collective models.
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) pioneered the application of a
Nash cooperative bargaining framework in the household context. In a Nash cooperative
bargaining model, the married couple solves a joint allocation problem to maximize the
product of individual gains to cooperation subject to a joint full-income constraint (McEl-
roy, 1997). The division of the utility gains from cooperation therefore varies systematically
with membersthreat point or fallback position, the level of utility individuals can expect
outside the marraige. An important contribution of this line of modeling is that the con-
cept of relative power within the household is made explicit through the fallback positions
or outside options, which ultimately determine intrahousehold allocation. McElroy (1990;
1997) describes these fallback positions as a function of demographic, legal, macroeconomic
and other institutional conditions external to the household.
A more general type of collective household model is the sharing-rule approach intro-
duced by Chiappori (1988; 1992; 1997). In a Chiappori-type collective model, there are no
restrictions on how joint decision making takes place, except that the resulting allocations be
e¢ cient. Thus, the household behaves as if it were maximizing the weighted sum of individ-
ual memberspreferences, where the weights or shares reect the relative bargaining power
of individuals (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003). The result is that the allocations more
closely reect the preferences of the more powerful household members, consistent with the
predictions of the Nash cooperative bargaining models. This model also exhibits the useful
property of nesting the unitary model. The household welfare function collapses to a single
set of preferences when preferences are common, i.e., the weights do not matter, or when the
sharing rule is weighted entirely towards one persons (the dictators) preferences, i.e., other
memberspreferences do not matter. This feature facilitated empirical tests of the unitary
5
model, and has led to the accumulation of empirical evidence against it (Alderman et al.,
1995).
These non-unitary models have thus rened the picture of the family from a perfectly
harmonious unit acting as one, to a diverse collection of individuals whose di¤erences are
resolved through the spirit of cooperation. After the negotiations and deliberations are done,
in the end, the family acts together. Underlying this view of the household is the assumption
that family members are able to make binding agreements to enforce the joint allocation,
and that irreconcilable di¤erences lead to divorce or household dissolution.6 In other words,
without cooperation, there is no household.
While divorce may be the ultimate threat in the context of marital bargaining, there
are reasons to expect that marital noncooperation is possible (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993).
Divorce may not always be socially acceptable, can entail prohibitive costs and irreversible
consequences, and therefore may not be a credible threat, particularly in the negotiation
of ordinary household disputes (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993; Bergstrom, 1996). A number
of researchers have instead used the noncooperative equilibrium within the marriage, aptly
described by Bergstrom (1996) as harsh words and burnt toast,as the threat point within
the Nash bargaining framework (for example, see Lundberg and Pollak, 1993; Carter and
Katz, 1997; Chen and Wooley, 2001). In a noncooperative marriage, partners behave inde-
pendently, pursuing their own personal preferences subject to their own resource constraints,
and contributing voluntarily towards the provision of household public goods. Noncooper-
ative bargaining models therefore nest both the cooperative and noncooperative solutions
within the same framework. If household members choose to cooperate, they pool all their
income and jointly allocate it, as in the cooperative solution. Otherwise, the outcome is a
noncooperative marriage given by the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.7
Perhaps the most inuential among the class of noncooperative bargaining models is
the separate spheres model introduced by Lundberg and Pollak (1993). When cooperation
breaks down due to prohibitive transactions costs or low expected gains from cooperation,
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the noncooperative separate spheres equilibrium is characterized by gender specialization in
the division of household responsibilities (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). Thus, each spouse
makes independent decisions within his or her own sphere of inuence, as dened by socially
recognized and accepted gender roles. An important contribution of this model is its explicit
attention to the role of traditional gender norms in coordinating behavior within households
even in the absence of explicit bargaining. This result is widely corroborated in ethnographic
research (Pahl, 1983; Benería and Roldán, 1987; Dwyer and Bruce, 1988; Pahl, 1989, 1995),
as well as in the more recent survey conducted by Goldstein and Udry (1999) in Ghana.
Although noncooperative bargaining models accommodate both cooperative and non-
cooperative behavior, these outcomes remain mutually exclusive. Therefore, it is unclear
how the same types of decisions can appear to be both jointly determined and individually
determined. The separate spheres equilibrium can o¤er more guidance in explaining this
phenomenon; what appears to be cooperation may in reality be a voluntary contribution
equilibrium shaped by traditional social norms. But because these norms are determined
outside the model, further analysis of this outcome within the separate spheres framework
is limited.8
Alternatively, this paper presents a simplied model of intrahousehold decision making
where individuals noncooperatively choose the optimal share of income they wish to de-
vote towards cooperation, where income is pooled and allocated collectively, and towards
noncooperation, where income is allocated independently. This approach of modeling some
decisions as cooperative and some decisions as noncooperative is in line with more recent
semi-cooperative models proposed in the literature. For example, in the conjugal contract
model proposed by Carter and Katz (1997), most decisions are assumed to be noncooper-
ative except for transfers between household members, which is the subject of cooperative
bargaining. Fletschner (2009) builds on Carter and Katzs (1997) conjugal contract model
by specifying transfers of credit between spouses as the subject of bargaining. Another ex-
ample is the model proposed by Konrad and Lommerud (2000), where they assume that
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human capital investments are chosen noncooperatively in the rst period, while subsequent
day-to-day time allocation is chosen cooperatively. Similarly, Lundberg and Pollak (2003)
present a model where a couples initial location decision is chosen noncooperatively, while
subsequent decision making proceeds collectively and e¢ ciently. These last two models, in
particular, emphasize the ine¢ ciencies that arise from the noncooperative decisions. The
semi-cooperative model proposed in this paper, on the other hand, emphasizes how spouses
choose their optimal degree of cooperation and its implications on information-sharing within
households.
The next section presents the model and derives its implications using the example of
joint saving as an area of cooperation within the household.
III. Model
Consider a married couple, husband (h) and wife (w), who earn exogenous incomes
Yh > 0 and Yw > 0, respectively.9 The well-being of the partners are linked through the
joint consumption of household public goods (e.g., a shared dwelling, household sanitation,
childrens well-being, precautionary savings, etc.). In the absence of cooperation, each person
can contribute voluntarily towards the provision of household public goods. As Lundberg and
Pollak (1993) point out, the standard result is that these public goods will be underprovided
under a voluntary contribution equilibrium.10
Alternatively, individuals can cooperate by contributing some portion i of their income,
0  i  1, i = h;w, into a household pot for the provision of household public goods. The
proportion i can be interpreted as the degree to which the individual chooses to cooperate
with his or her spouse.11 Following the collective model, assume that the couple allocates the
pooled household income jointly through some unspecied process, as if they were maximiz-
ing their weighted preferences where the weights or shares represent their relative bargaining
strengths (Chiappori, 1992, 1997; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003). The resulting allocation
of the pooled household income will more closely reect the preferences of the more powerful
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spouse. This process is assumed to yield the e¢ cient level of household public goods. Thus,
pooling income and coordinating the individualscontributions in this way, i.e., cooperation,
yields potential gains relative to the voluntary contribution or noncooperative equilibrium.
Formally, the outcome of cooperation is described as follows. Let the (net) gains12 from
cooperation be represented by the function G (hYh; wYw)  0, such that G (0; wYw) =
G (hYh; 0) = 0. Thus, the case where only one person contributes to the household public
good is dened here as noncooperation. If some cooperation does take place, h > 0 and
w > 0, the couple splits the gains from cooperation G (:) according to an exogenous sharing
rule, 0    1, which summarizes the extent to which each persons preferences are reected
in the allocation of pooled income. The sharing rule can be interpreted as the reduced
form of some unspecied process, and is correlated with the relative bargaining strengths of
individuals. This unspecied process could entail some form of bargaining or negotiation,
and may also be determined by other external factors like social norms and institutions.
Assuming that  is the husbands share, the contributions hYh and wYw yield a payo¤ of
G (hYh; wYw) for the husband, and (1  )G (hYh; wYw) for the wife.
Any leftover income not pooled remains as discretionary income of the individual, allo-
cated independently without the need to coordinate with ones spouse. This discretionary
income may be used for private consumption, private saving, or contributed towards any
other household public goods that the couple do not wish to jointly provide. Let the total
individual payo¤be the weighted sum of the benets from cooperation and the benets from
the remaining discretionary income:
H: h = hG (hYh; wYw) + (1  h) (1  h)Yh;(1)
W: w = w (1  )G (hYh; wYw) + (1  w) (1  w)Yw:(2)
where 0  i  1; and 0  i  1, i = h;w. The weights i represent the preference of person
i for the cooperation benets relative to discretionary income. Thus, in deciding how much
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to contribute towards cooperation, individuals must weigh the benets of increasing their
contribution to the household pool against the forgone benet of allocating that additional
income independently.
Each person then chooses the contribution that maximizes his or her total payo¤. The
rst-order conditions represent reaction functions, i.e., each persons best response given
the spouses actions. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is given by the intersection of the two
reaction functions.
This model is similar to a conventional noncooperative bargaining model in many ways.
Cooperation is possible and can yield potential benets. Under cooperation, income is pooled
and jointly allocated according to the bargaining strengths of individuals. Noncooperation
is also possible, under which individuals can allocate their income independently. In this
model, restricting the contributions such that i = f0; 1g yields outcomes equivalent to
those obtained in a noncooperative bargaining model. Thus, the key di¤erence between this
model and the noncooperative bargaining model is that i can take on a range of values,
0  i  1, and therefore the gains from cooperation may also vary.
From this simple model, it is clear that the resulting income pooling outcome depends
largely on the characteristics of the function G (:). The nature of the areas of cooperation
within the household as well as the social norms and institutions that govern the cooperation
process will determine the degree to which couples will pool their income and cooperate. In
the next section, this framework is applied to a situation where the couple can cooperate in
saving for adverse shocks. The example of savings is chosen specically because partial sav-
ings pooling has been observed by researchers in a number of specialized surveys (Anderson
and Baland, 2002; Ashraf, 2009).
A. Example: Saving for a Rainy Day
Consider a couple in a low-income developing country context where insurance and credit
markets are imperfect. Thus, self-insurance through precautionary savings is an important
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strategy for dealing with unexpected adverse events (e.g., natural calamities, accidents, theft,
etc.). Any savings held by individuals that is shared with the household when bad shocks
occur can therefore be viewed as a household public good. For simplicity, assume that the
interest rate is zero.
Suppose that saving for emergencies is the only area of cooperation that can yield
potential benets to the couple.13 For example, consider the possibility of a bad storm
damaging the roof of the house and causing it to leak. Since this unexpected event a¤ects
the entire household, both individuals will be expected to make a contribution towards xing
the roof. Setting aside a fund that the couple could draw on for such emergencies therefore
yields potential benets, relative to the situation where each would have to reallocate their
discretionary spending as the need arises. In this context, it is reasonable to assume that
increasing one persons contribution, holding the other spouses contribution constant, yields
positive but diminishing benets. It is also reasonable to assume decreasing returns to scale,
e.g., doubling both individualscontributions yields less than double the increase in benets.
For couples, cooperation can also be a source of emotional connection and an expression
of caring. Individual contributions to a joint savings fund may be valued for the e¤ort it
embodies, in addition to its material worth. Couples may therefore enjoy benets from joint
saving that go beyond the practical act of saving for a rainy day. If indeed the willingness to
contribute to joint savings by one partner is taken to be an expression of caring and harmony,
then the other spouse may be more willing to reciprocate and contribute more as well, at
the very least out of respect or a sense of familial obligation (Badgett and Folbre, 1999).
The gains from cooperation can therefore be represented by the Cobb-Douglas function:
(3) G (hYh; wYw) = A (hYh)
 (wYw)

where the benets depend on the savings pooling contributions hYh and wYw. The para-
meters A,  and  are positive constants such that 0 < ;  < 1 and  +  < 1. Thus,
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the gains from cooperation exhibits positive but diminishing returns to the contributions of
individuals and decreasing returns to scale. The parameters  and  represent the benet
elasticities of the contributions of the husband and wife, respectively. On the other hand, the
parameter A can represent other factors that could shift the net benets from joint saving.
These factors can include, but need not be limited to, the physical and social infrastructure
that inuence the frequency and severity of adverse shocks, the availability and characteris-
tics of local nancial institutions, as well as social norms that govern how men and women
share nancial information.
If some cooperation does take place, h > 0 and w > 0, the couple allocate the pooled
savings jointly according to an exogenous sharing rule, 0    1. The sharing rule summa-
rizes the extent to which each persons preferences are reected in how the savings are used
and therefore reects the relative bargaining strengths of individuals. For example, couples
may disagree on which shocks take precedence. Should a larger share of the funds be spent
on xing the roof, or in replacing a broken stove? In the extreme case where  = 1 or  = 0,
one spouse is able to dictate his or her preferences over how the pooled resources will be
used and is therefore able to capture all the benets from cooperation. The spouse whose
preferences are ignored cannot enjoy the material and psychic benets from cooperation.
Assuming that  is the husbands share, contributing hYh and wYw to the pooled
savings account yields payo¤s of A (hYh)
 (wYw)
 and (1  )A (hYh) (wYw) for the
husband and wife, respectively. Substituting Eq. (3) into Eqs. (1) and (2) yields the
following total payo¤ functions:
H: h = hA (hYh)
 (wYw)
 + (1  h) (1  h)Yh;(4)
W: w = w (1  )A (hYh) (wYw) + (1  w) (1  w)Yw:(5)
Each individual must then choose the contribution that yields the highest total payo¤
subject to his or her budget constraint, i  1. The individual maximization problem is
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0qh
qwq*w
q*h
E
Husband: qh = f (qw)
Wife: qw = g (qh)
Figure 1: Reaction Functions
given by:
(6) max
i
i s.t. i  1; i = h;w:
Assuming interior solutions, the rst-order conditions are:14
H: h =
1
Yh

h
(1  h)A (wYw)

 1
1 
;(7)
W: w =
1
Yw

w
(1  w) (1  )A (hYh)

 1
1 
:(8)
These rst-order conditions are best response or reaction functions, representing the
optimal contribution i for every possible contribution of the spouse j, i 6= j. The Cournot-
Nash equilibrium is given by the intersection of these two reaction functions, i.e., when both
spouses choose mutual best responses. Figure 1 shows the individual reaction functions and
the resulting equilibrium, point E.
Solving for h and w simultaneously using Eqs. (7) and (8) yields the following equi-
13
librium contributions:
H: h =
1
Yh
"
A

h
1  h
1  
w (1  )
1  w
# 11  
;(9)
W: w =
1
Yw
"
A

w (1  )
1  w
1 
h
1  h
# 11  
:(10)
The solutions given by Eqs. (9) and (10) show that there are four sets of factors
that inuence the shares of income spouses will contribute to the joint savings account: own
income, relative bargaining power , the benets from the cooperation process as determined
by the parameters , , and A, and the preferences of individuals given by the parameters
h and w.
B. Comparative Statics
From Eqs. (9) and (10), it is clear that the share of income that a person will contribute
to joint savings is inversely related to his or her own income and are independent of the
spouses income. For example, Figure 2 shows the e¤ect of an increase in the wifes income.
The result is that the wifes reaction function shifts to the left, so that for every share chosen
by her husband, she will contribute a smaller share of her income to the savings pool. On
the other hand, the husbands reaction function shifts up such that his contribution will
remain unchanged in equilibrium, while the wifes share will decrease to w . This result is
to be expected since the benets from cooperation depend on the absolute contributions.
Formally, the comparative static e¤ects of own income are given by the following:
@h
@Yh
=   1
Y 2h
"
A

h
1  h
1  
w (1  )
1  w
# 11  
< 0;(11)
@w
@Yw
=   1
Y 2w
"
A

w (1  )
1  w
1 
h
1  h
# 11  
< 0:(12)
and the comparative static e¤ects of the partners income is given by @

h
@Yw
= @

w
@Yh
= 0.
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qwq*w
q*h E Husband: qh = f (qw)
Wife: qw = g (qh)
ß
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q**w
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Figure 2: E¤ect of an Increase in Yw
The comparative static e¤ect of relative bargaining power is less straightforward. Look-
ing at the reaction functions in Eqs. (7) and (8), it is clear that each persons best response
increases with their own bargaining power. Therefore, an increase in  will shift the hus-
bands reaction function outwards, and at the same time shift the wifes reaction function
inwards. The net e¤ect on the equilibrium outcome will depend on which shift dominates.
Taking the partial derivative of the equilibrium solutions h and 

w with respect to  yields
the following signs:
@h
@
T 0 if 1  

T 
1   ;
@w
@
T 0 if 1  

T 1  

:
Given  and , the comparative static e¤ect of increasing the relative bargaining power
of the husband depends on the existing balance of power. Increasing the bargaining power
of one party is more likely to encourage cooperation, i.e., both spouses contribute more, if
that party was initially disadvantaged. So moving from a high degree of inequality towards
more equality increases cooperation, consistent with Pahls (1995) ndings that egalitarian
couples are more likely to pool and jointly manage their money.15
15
Suppose that the husband initially has the bargaining advantage so that his preferences
dominate how joint savings are allocated, and that both spouses cooperate partially (0 <
i < 1). An increase in the wifes bargaining power will increase her share of the gains
from joint saving and therefore she will be willing to increase her contribution. An increase
in her contribution increases the husbands gains as well. So long as this increase in the
husbands gains more than o¤sets his loss from the decline in his relative bargaining power,
he will reciprocate and contribute more. On the other hand, any additional increases in the
husbands bargaining power will further reduce the benets from joint saving enjoyed by the
wife. She will then reduce her contribution, the overall gains from joint saving contracts,
reducing the benets the husband enjoys, and so he too will reduce his contribution.
But what happens if the existing balance of power is already equal, i.e.,  = 1
2
? In
this case, the comparative static e¤ect of moving away from equality depends solely on the
benet elasticity of the other spouses contribution to joint savings. Therefore, the change in
the husbands contribution depends on , and the change in the wifes contribution depends
on . This yields the following signs:
@h
@
T 0 if 1
2
T ;
@w
@
T 0 if  T 1
2
:
Suppose that initially the spouses have equal bargaining power ( = 1
2
), and that both
spouses cooperate partially (0 < i < 1). An increase in the husbands bargaining power
( ") will increase both spousescontribution to joint savings if the husbands benet elas-
ticity is high ( > 1
2
) and the wifes benet elasticity is low ( < 1
2
). This result is intuitive:
the spouse whose contribution is more productive, given by the high benet elasticity, will
be inclined to contribute even more when his bargaining power is increased. An increase
in the husbands contribution increases the wifes gains as well. So long as the increase in
the wifes gains more than o¤sets her loss from the decline in her bargaining power, she will
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reciprocate and contribute more. On the other hand, if the benet elasticities are reversed
so that the husbands benet elasticity is low ( < 1
2
) and the wifes benet elasticity is
high ( > 1
2
), increasing the husbands relative bargaining power (i.e., decreasing the wifes
bargaining power) will decrease both spousescontributions. In this case, the spouse whose
contribution to joint savings is more productive will be inclined to reduce her contribution
when her bargaining power is decreased. This in turn also reduces the husbands gains, and
he will also decrease his contribution.16
Lastly, the comparative static e¤ects of A can be easily deduced from Eqs. (9) and (10).
Factors that increase the overall benets from cooperation will encourage income pooling,
increasing the equilibrium contributions from both spouses. The e¤ect of increasing A is
illustrated in Figure (??), where both spouses increase their equilibrium contributions to
point E 0 = (w ; 

h ).
Formally, the comparative static e¤ects of A are given by the following:
@h
@A
=

c5
1    

A
+
1   > 0(13)
@w
@A
=

c6
1    

A
+
1   > 0(14)
where c5 and c6 are positive constants.
When both partners contribute their full income to joint savings, w = 

h = 1, the
contributions become public information and so no income can be hidden. Therefore, the
hiding of income can only occur under partial income pooling or nonpooling, i.e., 0  w; h <
1. Because hidden income implies noncooperation, the conditions that reduce contributions
to joint savings, and thus increase discretionary income, create opportunities for hiding
income. Nevertheless, noncooperation by itself does not provide an incentive to hide nancial
information. To explore these incentives further, another dimension of power is introduced
in the model.
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C. Limited Autonomy
The model so far assumes that both individuals have the ability to choose how much of
their income they wish to devote to cooperation. This may not always be the case, however;
social and gender norms could assign the right to choose the share of income to be contributed
by the couple to either the husband only or the wife only. For example, many cultures assign
men as the traditional head of the household, which could suggest that wives are compelled to
comply with what their husbands deem as the appropriate contribution. This is akin to what
Pahl (1983) refers to as control, which is the decision making power over the type of allocative
system the household should adapt. Ethnographic evidence suggests that the patriarchal
regime is the norm among households in slum areas in Kenya (Anderson and Baland, 2002),
people from Upper Egypt (Hoodfar, 1988), the Yoruba people in Nigeria (Fapohunda, 1988),
and the Beti poeple in Cameroon (Guyer, 1988). On the other hand, some cultures assign
women as the traditional pursekeepers or money managers of the household, as observed
by researchers in Indonesia (Papanek and Schwede, 1988), the Philippines (Aguilar, 1991;
Ashraf, 2009), and Thailand (Nguanbanchong, 2004). This norm may confer to women the
authority to demand what they deem as the appropriate contribution from their husbands.
These cases can be accommodated in the model by restricting the assumption of auton-
omy to apply only to one spouse and not the other. Imposing this restriction therefore adds
another dimension of power in the model in addition to bargaining power.
Patriarchal Regime. Suppose that the husband has the sole authority to choose the
income share to be contributed by both husband and wife to the joint savings pool. Assume
also that his choice is enforceable, i.e., his wife is compelled to contribute the appropriate
amount he demands. Therefore, the husband chooses the share that maximizes his payo¤,
and then the wife follows the husbands lead and contributes the same proportion of her in-
come. Using the previous specication of the cooperation gains, the husbands maximization
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problem is given by:
(15) max
P
h = hA
+
P Y

h Y

w + (1  h) (1  P )Yh;
and the rst-order condition is given by:
(16)
( + ) hAY

h Y

w
1  P
= (1  h)Yh:
The optimal degree of cooperation under the patriarchal regime is:
(17) P =

( + ) hAY

w
(1  h)Y 1 h
 1
1  
;
which is increasing in the wifes income, decreasing in the husbands income, and increasing
in the husbands bargaining power.
Matriarchal Regime. Conversely, suppose that the wife has the sole authority to
choose the income share to be contributed by both husband and wife. Again, assume that
her choice is enforceable, i.e., her husband is compelled to contribute the appropriate amount
she demands. The wifes maximization problem is therefore given by:
(18) max
M
w = w (1  )A+M Y h Y w + (1  w) (1  M)Yw;
and the rst-order condition is given by:
(19)
( + ) w (1  )AY h Y w
1  M
= (1  w)Yw:
The optimal degree of cooperation under the matriarchal regime is:
(20) M =

( + ) w (1  )AY h
(1  w)Y 1 w
 1
1  
;
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which is increasing in the husbands income, decreasing in the wifes income, and increasing
in the wifes bargaining power.
D. Discussion
In the household regimes described above, there are two particular results that di¤er
from the case of individual autonomy. First, the equilibrium degree of cooperation P and
M depend on both spousesincomes, whereas under individual autonomy only ones own
income mattered. An increase in income of the non-deciding spouse would have reduced that
spouses contribution under individual autonomy. But under limited autonomy, the partner
who does decide will want to increase the degree of cooperation in the household to be able
to share the benets from the higher income from the non-deciding spouse.
Second, the comparative static e¤ect of relative bargaining power is no longer ambigu-
ous. The degree of cooperation in the household will be increasing in the deciding spouses
bargaining power. Thus, increasing womens bargaining power within a patriarchal regime
will result in a lower share of income pooled by both the husband and the wife. When
the wife has more inuence in how the joint savings account will be used, the cooperation
benets realized by the husband is reduced. Consequently, he will decrease his contribution
and his wife follows suit.
Conversely, increasing womens bargaining power within a matriarchal regime will result
in more income pooling for both spouses. Increasing the wifes bargaining power implies that
she is better able to inuence the allocation of the joint resources towards her preferences
and is thus able to capture a larger share of the cooperation gains. Under a matriarchal
regime, the wife will then choose to contribute a higher share of her income to the household
pool and demand the same higher share from her husband.
Given that men tend to earn higher incomes on average compared to women (Blau
and Kahn, 2003; International Labour Organisation, 2009), under which regime can one
expect to observe more income pooling? This model predicts that, the higher the income
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gap between the husband and wife, the more likely that the couple will pool more income
under a matriarchal regime. This result is intutive. If the husband earns signicantly more
than the wife, and the wife has the sole authority to choose the contributions, the wife will
demand a larger contribution from the husband to be able to share in the benets of that
income. Comparing the two solutions yields the following condition:
(21) M > 

P if
Yh
Yw
>
h (1  w)
(1  ) (1  h) w :
This result suggests that conventional household surveys that implicitly assume full
income pooling are more likely to miss more information in populations where a patriarchal
household regime is the norm, compared to populations where a matriarchal regime is more
common. More generally, however, limited autonomy can create incentives for the non-
deciding partners to conceal income from their spouses if they are compelled to contribute
a higher share than they would prefer if they had the choice.
Under a patriarchal regime, the wife has an incentive to hide income if the contribution
demanded by the husband, P , is greater than the optimal income share she would choose
to contribute if she could decide for herself, w. Comparing the two solutions yields the
following condition:
(22) P > 

w if

(1  ) >
Yh
Yw
w (1  h)
h (1  w)


 + 
 1
1 
:
So given a patriarchal regime, the wife is more likely to have an incentive to hide income as
the husbands bargaining power rises, and as her own income rises. Conversely, the wife is
less likely to hide income as her own bargaining power rises, and as her income falls. This
result is consistent with Anderson and Balands (2002) observation that married women
who participate and therefore save secretly in ROSCAs have higher individual incomes on
average compared with non-participants. They argue that the primary reason women seek
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to hide their savings from their husbands is the asymmetry of preferences, where women
value household public goods more than men. But conicting preferences in itself would
not lead women to hide their income if they had enough bargaining power in the household.
Thus, the role of power, which comes through very clearly in Anderson and Balands (2002)
ethnographic interviews, is made more explicit in this model, where the interaction of both
autonomy and bargaining power could explain the need of women to hide their savings. In
the case where the husband is completely dominant, i.e.,  ! 1 as in a unitary model, the
wifes incentive to hide income will be very high. Therefore, collecting data from the husband
alone, even in the case of a dictatorship, will potentially miss any nancial information hidden
by the wife.
Similarly, the husband under a matriarchal regime has an incentive to hide income if
the contribution demanded by the wife, M , is greater than the optimal share he would
choose to contribute if he could decide for himself, h. Comparing the two solutions yields
the following condition:
(23) M > 

h if
(1  )

>
Yw
Yh
h (1  w)
w (1  h)


 + 
 1
1 
:
So given a matriarchal regime, the husband is more likely to have an incentive to hide income
as the wifes bargaining power rises, and as his own income rises. It follows that the husband
is less likely to hide income as his own bargaining power rises, and as his own income falls.
This result appears to be consistent with Ashrafs (2009) ndings regarding the e¤ect of a
positive income shock on saving behavior in the Philippines. She reports that among the
men whose wives make the savings decisions in the household (a matriarchal regime), men
are more likely to save the windfall income into their own account when their wives will not
be informed of their decision, and are more likely to commit it to personal consumption when
their wives will be informed (Ashraf, 2009). She also nds similar behavior among women
whose husbands make the household savings decisions (a patriarchal regime) (Ashraf, 2009).
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As noted above, wives are more likely to have an incentive to hide income as their own
income rises under a patriarchal regime.
The relative taste for cooperation (i) can also contribute to the incentive to hide income.
As might be expected, the non-deciding spouse is more likely to hide income if the deciding
spouses taste for cooperation is stronger than their own. So under a matriarchal regime,
if the wife has a stronger preference for cooperation than the husband (w > h), then
the husband will be more likely to hide income. Given these same preferences, there will
be less incentive for the wife to hide income under a patriarchal regime, since the optimal
contribution chosen by the husband is unlikely to exceed his wifes own desired contribution.
Note that the incentive to hide income can exist in both regimes even when bargaining
power is equal,  = 1
2
. Equal power implies that the preferences of both husband and wife
are equally reected in the allocation of joint savings and so they also share equally in the
benets from cooperation. Nevertheless, income asymmetries could still create incentives for
hiding income. A high-earning wife in a patriarchal regime and a high-earning husband in a
matriarchal regime may not wish to contribute as much as their partner demands, even with
equal bargaining power. In both these cases, there will be an incentive for the non-deciding
spouse to hide income.
All these results depend largely on the characteristics of the G (:) function. In the
example of precautionary savings adopted here, the gains from cooperation is specied as a
Cobb-Douglas function. However, applying this model to a di¤erent context of cooperation
that exhibits di¤erent characteristics in terms of returns to scale, marginal benets and
marginal cross-benets is likely to yield a di¤erent set of results. Thus, how researchers
conceptualize the areas of cooperation within the household is crucial in predicting the
income pooling behavior of couples. To further guide economists in unraveling the black
box of intrahousehold behavior, more qualitative and quantitative information should be
collected regarding the process of cooperation within households.
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IV. Conclusions
The model developed in this paper combines features of noncooperative bargaining
models (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993; Carter and Katz, 1997; Konrad and Lommerud, 2000;
Chen and Wooley, 2001) and collective models (Chiappori, 1988, 1992, 1997; Quisumbing
and Maluccio, 2003) to demonstrate the semi-cooperative character of household nancial
decision making. Noncooperative bargaining models use the noncooperative equilibrium as
the threat point in a cooperative bargaining game. The outcome is either cooperation, if
the utility gains from cooperation are su¢ cient, or noncooperation, if the threat points o¤er
more utility. In contrast, the model introduced here recognizes that cooperative and nonco-
operative behavior within households need not be mutually exclusive. The key innovation of
this approach is to characterize individualsdecision to cooperate as a continuous variable,
dened by the share of income they choose to contribute to the household pool.
Applied to the example of saving as an area of household cooperation, this model pre-
dicts that the equilibrium contributions to the joint savings account is decreasing in own
income and increasing in other factors that can shift the overall benets of saving jointly.
These factors can include physical and social infrastructure, the characteristics of local -
nancial institutions, as well as social norms that govern how men and women share nancial
information. However, the relationship between the joint savings contributions and relative
bargaining power depend on the initial balance of power. In particular, increasing the bar-
gaining power of one partner is more likely to result in higher savings pooling only if that
person was initially disadvantaged. This is also consistent with Pahls (1995) ndings that
egalitarian couples are more likely to pool and jointly manage their money.
In addition to the concept of bargaining power within a cooperative setting, another
dimension of power can be imposed on the model by restricting individual autonomy to apply
to only one spouse. Limited autonomy can create incentives for the non-deciding partners
to conceal income from their spouses if they are compelled to contribute a higher share than
they would prefer if they had the choice. When the husband has the authority to decide on
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both spousesjoint saving contributions, the wife is more likely to have an incentive to hide
income as the husbands bargaining power rises, and as her own income rises. Conversely,
when it is the wife who holds that authority, the husband is more likely to have an incentive
to hide income as the wifes bargaining power rises, and as his own income rises. These
observations appear to be consistent with the ndings of Ashraf (2009) in the Philippines,
where a positive income shock is more likely to be hidden by husbands in matriarchal regimes
and by wives in patriarchal regimes.
Also, the larger the gap between male and female incomes, the more likely that a ma-
triarchal regime will exhibit a higher degree of savings pooling relative to a patriarchal
regime. Since women continue to earn lower incomes on average compared with men (Blau
and Kahn, 2003; International Labour Organisation, 2009), this result suggests that con-
ventional household surveys that implicitly assume full income pooling are more likely to
miss more information in populations where a patriarchal household regime is the norm,
compared to populations where a matriarchal regime is more common.
This model reinforces the issues raised by noncooperative household models on tradi-
tional survey methodology, thus providing further theoretical support for the call to collect
survey data from individuals rather than household representatives. If individuals delib-
erately conceal income from their spouse to avoid pooling that income, then the private
information missed by traditional surveys will be nonrandom and may signicantly bias em-
pirical analyses that use household income as a regressor (Ashraf, 2009). Furthermore, if
the contributions to the household pool depend on bargaining power, as this model suggests,
then this could result in signicant collinearity between the proxy measures of bargaining
power and pooled household income. Both issues can be addressed by collecting nancial
data from individuals in separate interviews, which better captures any private information
withheld by the individual from the rest of the household.
Although this models assumptions are plausible, as corroborated by the interdiscipli-
nary evidence on this subject, whether the optimal conditions implied by the model actually
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hold in reality is an empirical question that merits further study. To answer this question,
more detailed information on decision making processes, the nature of cooperation, and in-
formation sharing practices within the household must be collected in addition to individual
nancial information.
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Notes
1Lundberg and Pollak (1993) argue that the noncooperative solution can arise if binding
contracts are not enforceable or if transactions and/or monitoring costs overwhelm potential
gains from cooperation.
2Note that under noncooperation, information may or may not be publicly shared within
the household. Thus, public information is consistent with both cooperation and noncoop-
eration, while private information strictly implies noncooperation.
3In a unitary model, one spouse can act as a dictator (benevolent or otherwise), controling
all resources and making all the decisions. Thus, complete information can be obtained so
long as the benevolent dictator or household head is chosen as the survey respondent.
4The 2002 UPHWS is a multi-country dataset collected by American University and
Cornell University researchers in Bolivia, Ecuador, Thailand and the Philippines. Its credit,
savings and decision making modules were collected from husbands and wives privately in
separate interviews.
5An alternative strategy is to report ghostexpenses or salary deductions, referred to
in the Tagalog vernacular as kupit (literally, to pilfer) (Ashraf, 2009).
6Since marital bargaining can be interpreted as a repeated game, the enforceability of the
cooperative outcome can be justied using the folk theorem (Pollak, 2005).
7More recently, researchers have moved towards accommodating more noncooperative
behavior within households in other ways. For example, see Konrad and Lommerud (2000),
Lundberg and Pollak (2003), Aura (2005), Mazzocco (2007), and Fletschner (2009).
8See Elster (1989) and Sugden (1989) for a discussion of how norms are established and
maintained.
9Note that this model is applicable to any two-person household. By assuming that
individuals earn exogenous incomes, it is implicitly assumed that wage rates are given and
that each individual spends a xed number of hours in market work. More generally, Yi can
be interpreted as some xed endowment, such as time, land, and other assets.
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10According to Lundberg and Pollak (1993, p. 993): If individual family members can
supply public goods consumed by the entire household, then the noncooperative family equi-
librium is analogous to the voluntary provision of public goods model analyzed by Bergstrom
et al (1986). As one might expect, public goods are undersupplied in this noncooperative
equilibrium, and there are potential gains to cooperation. Additional gains can be expected
if coordination of individual contributions is required for e¢ cient household production. In
the absence of cooperation and coordination, the e¤ective quantity of public goods and ser-
vices such as meals and child care will be less than the amounts that could be produced from
the individual contributions.
11i may also embody the e¤ort with which the xed resource Yi is applied towards a
cooperative activity.
12More generally, the gains to cooperation function G (:) is net of any monitoring or
transactions costs associated with the cooperation process. Note that the benets from
cooperation represent utility gains from the consumption of a higher quantity of household
public goods provided under cooperation.
13Assume that all other household public goods are provided noncooperatively, such that
individuals specialize in the provision of those public goods that fall in their traditional
gendered sphere of inuence (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993).
14If the budget constraint binds for one partner, such that she contributes her full in-
come, the equilibrium outcome is obtained by substituting the maximum contribution in the
spouses reaction function. Note that full cooperation by one spouse does not guarantee full
cooperation by the other. In the trivial case where one persons optimal contribution is zero,
no gains will be realized and therefore neither spouse will contribute. This latter case yields
the noncooperative outcome.
15Specically, the more dominant the husband is (as  ! 1), the more likely that @h
@
<
0 and @

w
@
< 0. So both husband and wife will pool a lower share of their income as the
husband gains even more bargaining power, i.e., as  ", and both husband and wife will pool a
32
higher share of their income as the wife gains more bargaining power, i.e., as  #. Conversely,
the more dominant the wife is (as ! 0), the more likely that @h
@
> 0 and @

w
@
> 0. So when
it is the wife who initially has the bargaining advantage, increasing the husbands relative
bargaining power will result in both individuals contributing larger shares of their income
towards cooperation, and increasing the wifes bargaining power even more will result in
both individuals contributing smaller shares of their income towards cooperation.
16In the case of precautionary savings, it is not clear that one spouse would have an
advantage in producing more gains by contributing to the household pool. There could
be, however, other areas of cooperation where asymmetric benet elasticities are plausible.
For example, in countries where women grow subsistence crops and men grow cash crops,
womens contributions may be more e¤ective in ensuring food security for the household
because it is not tied to market uctuations.
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